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FAIR USE IN COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING
The copyright clause of the United States Constitution' empowers Congress
to promote the progress of science and the arts by granting authors a limited
monopoly over subsequent use of their creations in the form of a copyright.'
The Copyright Act of 19761 (Copyright Act) is the most recent legislation under
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Id. The copyright clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power to promote
the progress of science and the arts by giving authors and inventors exclusive rights over the
use of their writings and discoveries. Id. In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress construed the
word writings to mean any tangible expression that a person can reproduce with or without the
aid of a machine. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Congress adopted this construction of the scope of
the term writings from prior case law. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208-09 (1954) (pictorial,
graphic, or sculptured works appropriate subjects for copyright protection); Shaab v. Kleindienst,
345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972) (sound recording firms contitutionaly equivalent to authors
and therefore have copyright protection).
The first copyright statute was England's statute of Anne. 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710).
The Statute of Anne granted authors of existing books copyrights of 21 years dating from April
10, 1710. Id. The statute granted copyrights to authors of new books for a period of 14 years,
dating from the time of publication. Id. The statute also contained a supplemental provision
to extend copyright protection another 14 years if the author was still living when the original
copyright expired. Id. See generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRID VIEw OF COPYRIGHT 7 (1967)
(discussing Statute of Anne). In the United States, the Statute of Anne provided the basis for
early copyright legislation. See Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv. 203, 210-12
(1954) (discussing English origins of American copyright legislation). Connecticut enacted the
first American copyright statute in January, 1783. See Acts and Laws of the State of Connec-
ticut, in America 133-34 (1786) (discussing Connecticut copyright statute). The Connecticut statute
granted a 14 year copyright to authors of new works with a provision renewing the copyright
for another 14 years if the author was still alive at the expiration of the original 14 year copyright.
Id. By the time of the Constitutional convention, all of the original 13 states except Delaware
had enacted copyright statutes. B. KAPLAN, supra at 25. Congress enacted the first federal copyright
statute pursuant to the copyright clause in 1790. 1 Stat. 124, § I (1790). See generally T. SOLBERo,
COPYRIGHT ENAcTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1793-1906 32-77 (1908) (reprinting United States
copyright statues prior to 1906). The 1790 statute defined writings as maps, charts, and books
and limited the copyright to two 14 year terms. 1 Stat. 124, § 1 (1790); T. SOLBERO, supra, at
32. In 1802, Congress amended the definition of writings to include etchings and, in 1831, to
include musical compositions. T. SOLBERG, supra, at 35, 37; see 2 Stat. 171, § 2 (1802) (designers
of etchings may copyright creations); 4 Stat. 436, § 1 (1831) (writings includes musical composi-
tions). The 1831 statute also required an author to deposit a copy of the writing in the local
district court clerk's office. 4 Stat. 436, § 4 (1831); T. SOLBERG, supra, at 38. In 1846, however,
Congress amended the 1831 statute to require an author to deliver a copy of his writing to the
Smithsonian Institution, which the 1846 Act created. T. SOLBERG, supra, at 38. In 1865, Congress
again amended the definition of writings to include photographs. 13 Stat. 530, § 1 (1865); T.
SOLBERG, supra, at 44. In 1873, Congress enacted copyright legislation under Title 60 and placed
the administration of the Copyright Office under the Librarian of the Library of Congress. 60
U.S.C. § 4948, 18 Stat. 79 (1873); T. SOLBERG, supra, at 53. The 1909 Act, the last major copyright
legislation before the 1976 Act, included lectures, sermons, and movies within the definition of
writings. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (c), (1), (in) (1909), amended by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 810 (1982)).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
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the copyright clause.' In addition to defining the procedures for obtaining
a copyright, 5 the Copyright Act enumerates certain exceptions to the copyright
holder's monopoly. 6 Section 107 of the Copyright Act addresses the most
important of these exceptions, fair use.7 Section 107 is the first codification
of the fair use doctrine.8 Prior to 1976, fair use was an equitable common
law doctrine that balanced the author's interest in remuneration with society's
interest in reasonable access to useful information.9 Traditionally, courts limited
findings of fair use to noncommercial uses, reasoning that commercial uses
did not advance society's interest in access to useful information. 10 Although
courts more recently have concluded that the commercial nature of a given
use does not necessarily preclude a finding of fair use," courts still consider
the commercial nature of a use relevant in a determination of fair use.'2 A
4. Id; see B. KALAN, supra note 2, at 1-38 (discussing history of copyright clause); L.
SELTZER, ExmpTioNs AND FAr USE IN CoPYRIGHT 9-10 (1978) (discussing United States copyright
statutes).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-702 (1982) (discussing administrative procedures of Copyright Of-
fice). To obtain federal copyright protection, an author must register his writings with the Copyright
Office. Id. § 708(a). Once the author has registered the work, the author must put the public
on notice of the copyright. Id. § 401(a), 402(a). If the public can perceive the work visually,
with or without the aid of a machine, the notice must contain the symbol © or the word "copyright"
or the abbreviation "copr.", the first year of publication, and the author's name. Id. § 401(b)(1),
(2), (3). If the work is a sound recording, the notice should contain the symbol P, the first year
of publication of the sound recording, and the name of the sound recording's producer.
Id. § 402(b)(1), (2), (3). If the author created the work on or after January 1, 1978, the copyright
would last for the duration of the author's life and for 50 years after the author's death. Id.
.§ 302(a). If the author created the work before January 1, 1978, the same duration of copyright
protection applies, provided that the protection shall last at least 25 years. Id. § 303.
6. See, e.g., id. § 107 (discussing fair use); § 108 (library and archive reproduction);
§ 109 (record sales); § 110 (school performances of dramatic works); § 111 (secondary transmis-
sion of primary transmission); § 112 (movie showings); § 113 (discussing scope of exclusive rights
in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); § 114 (discussing scope of exclusive rights in sound
recordings); § 115 (discussing scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works); § 116
(discussing jukeboxes); § 117 (discussing scope of copyright protection in computer programs);
§ 118 (discussing scope of rights with regard to noncommercial broadcasting).
7. See id. § 107 (discussing fair use exemption to copyright protection).
8. L. SELTZER, supra note 4, at 10.
9. Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair
use is point at which courts subordinate author's interest in financial return to public interest
in development of useful knowledge), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 57-59 (§ 107 does not change common law fair use doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th
Cir. 1970) (defendant's use not fair because defendant's purpose commercial); Henry Holt &
Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (commercial purpose
of defendant's use precludes fair use).
11. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir.
1966) (whether use is commercial has little bearing on fair use question), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (commercial nature of defendant's use does
not automatically preclude fair use finding).
12. See, e.g., Consumers Union,, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1983) (commercial nature of defendant's use merely relevant to fair use question); Triangle
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minority of courts, however, are reluctant to hold that a particular form of
commercial use, commercial advertising, is fair use because courts still adhere
to a traditional view of fair use case law that commercial advertising cannot
promote a public interest. 3 The courts' emphasis on whether a particular use
promotes a public interest, however, has resulted in confusion of the purpose
of copyrights and fair use.' 4
The framers of the Constitution included the copyright clause to ensure
that society will benefit from the growth of culture and knowledge." The
copyright clause gives authors the incentive to produce by allowing authors
to obtain payment for use of their writings, thereby encouraging authors to
promote the growth of useful knowledge.' 6
Copyright protection is necessary since without copyright protection, an
author could not control or receive payment for nonconsensual uses. 7 The
limited monopoly of a copyright, however, enables an author to relinquish
physical control of his writings while retaining the legal right to charge for
use. 18 As a result, authors will have the incentive to create, contributing to
the growth of useful knowledge and benefiting society.' 9 Typically, an author's
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (com-
mercial nature of defendant's use not controlling but still relevant); Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's
Restaurants, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (courts should not give too much
weight to commercial nature of defendant's use); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (commercial nature of defendant's use not
determanitive but only relevant), aff'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1095, 1096 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5679 (fair use is not limited to nonprofit uses).
13. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant's use
of plaintiff's copyrighted work in advertisement not fair use because defendant's use solely for
commercial gain); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (defendant's use in advertisement of plaintiff's
copyrighted speeches not fair use since use promotes no public interest); D.C. Comics, Inc. v.
Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's use in commercial
advertisement not fair use as use was unjustified appropriation for personal gain).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102 (discussing court's misuse of copyright and
fair use equities).
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. The basis for the copyright clause is that authors
will have more incentive to produce if authors are ensured of personal gain for their creative
efforts. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
16. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (reward to
author induces release to public of creative works).
17. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 1600, 1610 (1982). The necessity for copyright
protection stems from the public goods characteristics of uncopyrited writings. Id. Uncopyrighted
writings are public goods because once the author has published a writing, the public can use
the work without the author's consent and without exhausting the supply that the words com-
prise. Id. at 1611; see Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293,
295 (1970) (discussing public goods concept).
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (copyright owner has exclusive right to reproduce and distribute
copyrighted work).
19. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (copyright gives authors incentive to pro-
duce creative works); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (copyright
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interest in remuneration will coincide with society's interest in access to useful
knowledge.20 In some instances, however, copyright restrictions on use will
inhibit public access to useful knowledge and thereby defeat the constitutional
purpose of the copyright clause. 2' To ensure that the author's right to control
serves the constitutional purpose of the copyright clause, courts developed
the doctrine of fair use.
22
Although the concept of fair use is difficult to define, 23 courts often
characterize fair use as a privilege of noncopyright holders to use copyrighted
induces author to release to public products of creative labors).
20. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1602.
21. Comment, Photocopying and Fair Use: An Examination of the Economic Factor In
Fair Use, 26 EmoRY L.J. 849-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Economic Factor]. The normal assump-
tion behind the copyright clause is that a copyright owner will seek others to pay for a use.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Often, however, copyright owners purchase copyrights
to prevent use by others. Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). This antidissemination motive defeats the purpose
of the copyright clause which is to allow societal access to useful knowledge. Mazer, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954); see, e.g., Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303, 310-311 (2d Cir. 1966) (court found that
copyright owner purchased copyrights not to publish works but to prevent uncontrolled use);
Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H.
1978) (court found fair use when political candidate sought to prevent political opponent's use
of copyrighted material in gubernatorial campaign).
22. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (courts
developed fair use to serve constitutional purpose of promoting science and arts), aff'dper curiam
by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The Williams court held that wholsesale library
photocopying was fair use. 487 F.2d at 1356. The Copyright Act of 1976, however, rendered
the Williams decision irrelevant by providing that library photocopying is an exemption to copyright
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982) (discussing photocopying exemption to copyright).
23. See 3 M. Nn4MIER, NM10OR ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05, at 13-55 to 13-56 (1978) (discussing
various definitions of fair use); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)
(per curiam ) (fair use most troublesome doctrine in copyright law). Courts have developed at
least four definitions of fair use. See 3 M. Nn&AsR, supra, § 13.05, at 13-55 to 13-56. The earliest
definition was that fair use was a use that did not merely copy the original work but improved
upon the work in some way. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901) (defendant's use not fair because defendant merely copied author's work). Courts
following the mere copying rationale reasoned that improvements on the original promoted the
growth of knowledge and therefore achieved the goal of fair use. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26
F. 519, 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (court must find fair use to insure growth of useful knowledge
when defendant's use improved on original); see also infra, notes 25-43 and accompanying text
(discussing Folsom and mere copying rationale). Another definition of fair use was a use to which
the author impliedly consented. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (law implies that author consents to later scientific use of his
work). Courts adopting the implied consent definition of fair use restricted findings of fair use
to later scientific uses because courts reasoned that authors would consent only to later scientific
uses of their copyrighted work. See infra note 74 (discussing implied consent rationale). Some
courts defined fair use as an insubstantial taking. See Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine,
and Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (defendant's use not fair because
substantial copying). The difficulty with defining fair use as an insubstantial similarity is that
the test for infringement is a substantial similarity. 3 M. NMMER, supra, § 13.05, at 13-56. Conse-
quently, any noninfringement would be a fair use. See id. Fair use, however, is a use that courts
allow despite infringement or substantial similarity. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982) (fair use is excep-
tion to copyright). Fair use as an exception to copyright is the fourth, and latest, definition of
fair use. 3 M. NIMaMR, supra, § 13.05, at 13-56.
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material without the copyright holder's consent. 2 The fair use doctrine first
appeared in the United States in Folsom v. Marsh.25 In Folsom, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright by copying
388 pages from the plaintiffs work into the defendant's work. 26 The defendant
argued that he had a right to copy from the plaintiffs work in the composition
of a new work." The Folsom court stated that the question was whether the
defendant's use was a justifiable use that the law did not consider an
infringement. 28 In considering whether the defendant's use was justifiable, the
Folsom court stated that the question involved the nature of the two works,
29
the extent of the copying 30 and the economic effect of the use on the
24. Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair
use is nonconsensual use that courts recognize as limited privilege of noncopyrighted holders),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); see Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (Ist
Cir. 1981) (citing Rosemont for definition of fair use); accord Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Rosemont); Roy Export
Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing Rose-
mont), aff'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1095, 1096 (2d Cir. 1980).
25. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Although Folsom was the first American
fair use case, the term fair use did not appear in American jurisprudence until Lawrence v. Dana.
15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
26. 9 F. Cas. at 343. In Folsom, the author of the infringing work was Charles W. Upham.
Id. Although Upham was the infringer, the plaintiffs brought the suit against the publishers because
the publishers, and not Upham, offered the work for sale. Id. Under the then current copyright
statute, a copyright owner could bring a suit for infringement only against the party that offered
the infringing work for public sale. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 520-21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1866) (defendant who sold printing plate of copyrighted work to newspaper which later printed
impression of plate not guilty of infringement in part because defendant did not offer work for sale).
In Folsom, the author of the work which the plaintiff had published was Jared Sparks.
Id. Spark's work, The Writings of George Washington, consisted of 12 volumes. Id. The first
volume was an original biography of Washington that Sparks had written. Id. at 344. The re-
maining 11 volumes, however, consisted entirely of the collected writings of Washington. Id.
Sparks earlier had obtained the copyright jointly with Chief Justice John Marshall from Justice
Bushrod Washington, nephew of President Washington. Id.
27. Id. In addition to claiming that an author of an essentially new work has the right
to quote from a similar work, the defendant in Folsom alleged two other defenses to the plain-
tiff's charge of infringement. Id. First, the defendant claimed that the letters of Washington
were not the subject of copyright because the letters were not literary. Id. The Folsom court
held, however, that any writing which the author intends to be private is literary and therefore
copyrightable. Id. at 345-46. The defendant's second defense was that the writings of Washington
were the property of the United States and, therefore, the plaintiff had no property right on
which to base a suit for infringement. Id. at 344. The Folsom court found that Congress purchased
the letters and, therefore, the letters were, to that extent, the property of the United States. Id.
at 347. The court stated, however, that Congress purchased the letters subject to the copyright
which the author already held on the writings. Id. The plaintiff, therefore, retained a sufficient
property interest in the letters to bring suit for infringement. See id.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id. In Folsom, the court concluded that both works were of great public value. Id.
at 348. The court stated, however, that even the publicly beneficial nature of the defendant's
use was not conclusive. Id. The court concluded, instead, that the crucial issue was the effect
of the use on the market value of the plaintiff's work. Id.; see infra note 31 (discussing Folsom
court's analysis of economic effect issue).
30. 9 F. Cas. at 344. In Folsom, the court stated that when considering the extent of the
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copyrighted work." The court examined the defendant's work and concluded
that the defendant's work was a substitute for the plaintiff's work because
the defendant's work was composed primarily of copied portions of the
plaintiff's work. 32 The court held, therefore, that the defendant's copying was
not a justifiable use because the defendant's work unfairly affected the value
of the plaintiff's work.
33
The significance of Folsom is that the court's several considerations have
become the accepted criteria for determining whether a particular use of a
copyrighted work is a fair use.34 Of equal significance in early fair use cases,
however, is the Folsom court's emphasis in denying fair use because the copied
sections of plaintiff's work were the major source of the societal value of
the defendant's work. 35 In other words, the defendant had attempted to reap
financial benefit by charging the public for use of information that the defen-
dant merely copied from the plaintiff's work. 36 In commercial advertising fair
use cases before 1976, the mere copying rationale underlies one of the two
major lines of cases. 37 The leading commercial advertising fair use case employ-
ing the mere copying rationale is Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School
of Fashion Modelling, Inc.3" In Conde Nast, the plaintiff brought suit to en-
join the defendant from using the term "Vogue" or covers of past issues of
Vogue magazine in the defendant's advertising. 39 In considering the defend-
ant's fair use defense, the Conde Nast court noted that the defendant copied
copying, a court not only should consider the quantitative percentage of the use in relation to
the copyrighted work but also should examine whether the use is of the most valuable portions
of the copyrighted work. Id. at 348-49. The court concluded that this qualitative examination
best determines the economic effect of the use on the copyrighted work. Id.
31. Id. at 344-45. The Folsom court stated that the economic effect of the use on the
copyrighted work was the most important factor in determining whether a particular use was
a fair use. See id. at 345. The court held that if the court found that a defendant's allegedly
infringing use substituted for the copyrighted work by merely copying the original, the use was
not a justifiable use. Id. The court also concluded that the economic effect analysis should in-
clude a determination of the effect of other similar uses on the copyrighted work because a find-
ing that one use is a fair use would mean that other similar uses would also be fair uses. Id.
at 349; see infra note 112 (discussing economic effect factor and res judicata).
32. 9 F. Cas. at 349.
33. Id.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (factors in examination of fair use include nature of uses,
extent of copying, and economic effect of copying); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. Naws 5659, 5679 (§ 107 restates present com-
mon law of fair use).
35. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (portions
of plaintiff's work that defendant copied impart greatest value to defendant's work).
36. Id.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49 (two rationales of early comnmercial advertis-
ing fair use cases were mere copying and per se theories).
38. 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
39. Id. at 327. In Conde Nast, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants infringed the registered
trademark, "Vogue," as the name of the corporation overseeing the plaintiffs magazine and
the common law trademark Vogue as the name of the plaintiff's magazine. Id. The plaintiff
also alleged that the defendants unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's name and goodwill. Id.
1392
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the essence of the plaintiff's copyrighted covers not to benefit the public by
providing new information but only to make an unearned profit. 40 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held, therefore,
that the defendant's use was not a fair use.
4'
The courts employing the mere copying rationale focused on the public
value of the allegedly infringing work by determining whether the defendant's
work provided new information to the public or whether the defendant mere-
ly copied information that already existed in the plaintiff's work. 2 In addi-
tion, the courts employing the mere copying rationale examined the economic
effect of the use on the original work because the courts reasoned that a passive
use rendered the use a substitute for the original work and thus unfairly af-
fected the market value of the copyrighted work.43 Although the other line
of commercial advertising fair use cases also examined whether the use pro-
moted the public interest, the other courts applied a per se rule that excluded
all commercial advertising from fair use, reasoning that commercial adver-
tisements could never promote the public interest. 41 In Henry Holt & Co. v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,4" the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennyslvania considered whether the defendant's use of excerpts
from the plaintiff's book in the defendant's commercial advertising could be
fair use.46 The Holt court stated that the fair use doctrine allows use of
The court held for the plaintiff on all three counts. Id. at 331-32. The plaintiff based the claim
of copyright infringement on the defendants' nonconsensual use of the artistic value of the covers
of plaintiff's magazine in the defendants' advertising. Id. at 332-33.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Conde Nast court's holding that the defendants' use was not a fair use because
the defendants copied the plaintiff's magazine covers only to save effort was also the rationale
of at least one other pre-1976 commercial advertising fair use case. See Robertson v. Batten,
Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1956). In Robertson, the
defendants used segments from the plaintiff's copyrighted melody in a singing commercial. Id.
at 797. In finding that the defendant's use was not a fair use, the Robertson court stated that
the defendant's use was a mere copying of that portion of the plaintiff's work on which the
commercial success of plaintiff's work depended. Id. at 798.
42. See Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798
(S.D. Cal. 1956) (defendants' use not fair because mere copy of valuable parts of plaintiff's work);
Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325,
332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (defendant's use not fair since motive only to save effort); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (defendant's use not fair because mere copy
of plaintiff's work).
43. See Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798
(S.D. Cal. 1956) (defendants' use of crucial parts of plaintiff's work decreased market value
of plaintiff's work); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (defendant's use of essence of plaintiff's magazine covers
detracted from market value of'plaintiff's work).
44. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing cases employing per se ra-
tionale in fair use examination).
45. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
46. Id. at 303. In Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., the plaintiff was
the publisher of a book discussing the human voice mechanism. Id. The defendant, a tobacco
company, published an advertisement in which the defendant quoted from the plaintiff's book
that smoking could not harm the throat. Id.
1984] 1393
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copyrighted works to promote science and the arts because the law implies
that the copyright owner would consent to such a use.47 The court concluded,
however, that commercial advertisements do not promote useful knowledge
and thus the plaintiff would not consent to the defendant's use. 48 As a result,
the defendant's use did not fall within the scope of fair use.4 1 Prior to 1976,
therefore, courts employed two standards to determine whether a particular
use was fair use, the mere copying rationale and the Holt per se rule."
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress first codified the fair use doctrine.5
More specifically, section 107 of the Copyright Act enumerates four factors
47. Id. at 304. In stating that courts intended fair use to promote science and the arts,
the Holt court followed the traditional justification for fair use. Id.; see Sayre v. Moore, 102
Eng. Rep. 139, n.140 (K.B. 1785) (fair use insures that progress of arts not hampered); Cohen,
Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. ASCAP 43, 48-50 (1955) (discussing
legal justifications for fair use). The Holt court's consensual basis for fair use was an early ex-
planation for fair use. See supra note 23 (discussing various definitions of fair use).
48. 23 F. Supp. at 304. The Holt court's reasoning that the defendant's use was not a
fair use as the plaintiff would not have consented to the use since the defendant's use did not
promote a public interest is a rationale that courts and commentators have rejected as a legal
fiction. See 3 M. NMMER, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-55 (consent rationale manifestly fiction).
Professor Nimmer notes that a restrictive legend on a work prohibiting copying gives no more
protection than a copyright notice. Id. Furthermore, one of the uses that the Copyright Act states
should be considered fair is criticism. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (fair use includes criticism
and comment). Since an author would not consent to criticism, fair use could not be consensually
based. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1172
(5th Cir. 1980). In Triangle, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's use in comparative
advertisements of the plaintiffs copyrighted work. Id. The Triangle court, however, considered
the comparative nature of the defendant's use a positive factor in the fair use examination. Id.
at 1176 n.13.
49. 23 F. Supp. at 304; see Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d
279, 284 (5th Cir. 1970) (fair use doctrine not applicable to defendant's use because defendant's
commercial use not for legitimate purpose); Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial
Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1944) (defendant's use not within definition of fair use
because defendant's use for commercial purposes).
In Tennessee, the plaintiff sought damages for the defendant's alleged infringement of
photographic representations of a decorative screen divider that the plaintiff had developed. 421
F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1970). The defendant claimed that use of the photographic representa-
tions was not infringement but was fair use. Id. at 281. In considering whether the defendant's
use was fair, the court stated that, to be fair, a use must be for some legitimate purpose. Id.
at 284. The court then held that the defendant's use was not fair because the purpose of the
defendant's use was not legitimate but only commercial. Id.
In Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, the defendant broad-
cast excerpts from the plaintiff's copyrighted song on the defendant's radio station. 141 F.2d
252, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1944). The plaintiff brought suit seeking damages for infringement. Id. at
854. The defendant claimed that the use was a fair use because the defendant, a nonprofit organiza-
tion, was not using the plaintiff's copyrighted work for commercial gain. Id. at 854-55. The
court concluded, however, that the defendant was using the plaintiff's copyrighted work for com-
mercial gain because the defendant used the work to increase the defendant's listening audience.
Id. at 855. The court then held that the doctrine of fair use did not apply to the defendant's
use since the purpose of the defendant's use was commercial. Id.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49 (two rationales of early fair use commercial
advertising cases mere copying and per se theories).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (codification of fair use).
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that courts should apply in determining whether a particular use is a fair use. 2
The first factor section 107 includes is the purpose and character of the use,
including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purposes. 3 The sec-
ond factor of section 107 is the nature of the copyrighted work,5" and the
third factor is the amount used in relation to the whole copyrighted work.5
Finally, courts should consider the economic effect of the use on the market
value of the copyright. 6
Section 107 does not define fair use, 7 but the drafters of section 107 in-
dicated that section 107 does not change, narrow, or enlarge the doctrine of
fair use in any way. 8 The drafters intended, instead, to leave the development
of the doctrine to the courts.59 Furthermore, section 107 does not indicate
how much weight courts should give each factor, 60 and states that the four
listed factors are not the only factors that courts should include in a fair use
determination. 6' The Copyright Act, therefore, leaves courts with almost com-
plete discretion in questions of fair use. 62
The most important consideration of section 107 with regard to commer-
cial advertising fair use cases, however, is that section 107 rejects the Holt
court's reasoning that commercial advertising can never come within the scope
of fair use. 63 The legislative history indicates that section 107 is not limited
to nonprofit uses but that the commercial nature of a use is only relevant
in a fair use determination. 64 The majority of commercial advertising fair
use cases since 1976 implemented the section 107 approach by rejecting the
Holt court's reasoning that a commercial use could never be a fair use. 65
52. Id.
53. Id. § 107(l).
54. Id. § 107(2).
55. Id. § 107(3).
56. Id. § 107(4).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEmvs 5659, 5679 (complexity of fair use doctrine precludes exact formulation).
58. See id. (§ 107 does not modify present fair use doctrine).
59. See id. (§ 107 leaves development of fair use doctrine to courts to apply on case-by-case
basis).
60. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175
(5th Cir. 1980) (§ 107 does not indicate relative importance of four factors).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (factors courts should employ in fair use examination "in-
clude" four factors of § 107); id. § 101 (defining "including" as illustrative and not limiting).
62. See 3 M. NIMMEiR, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-56, 58 (criticizing § 107 as indecisive);
L. SELTZER, supra note 4, at 20-21 (criticizing § 107 as overly general).
63. See H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659, 5679-80 (commercial purpose of use relevant but not conclusive to examina-
tion of fair use question); see also Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (defendant's commercial use not within scope of fair use).
64. Id.
65. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983)
(commercial nature of use merely relevant to fair use question); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (commercial nature of defend-
ant's use not conclusive to fair use determination); Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (courts should not give too much weight to commercial
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In Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corporation," for example,
the Second Circuit considered whether the defendant's use of excerpts from
the plaintiff's magazine in several television commercials could be a fair use.67
The court recognized that the defendant's use was clearly commercial." The
court determined, however, that the commercial purpose alone did not defeat
the defendant's fair use claim. 69 The court stated instead that the character
of the use, whether the use prompted some public interest, was more
important."0 The court concluded that the defendant's use was legitimate
because the defendant's use, although commercial, conveyed useful informa-
tion to the public71 and did not merely advance the defendant's commercial
nature of use). But see Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1981) (fair
use doctrine not applicable to uses solely for commercial gain); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Ed-
die, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's use unjustified appropriation
for personal gain so not fair use).
66. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1046-47.
68. Id. at 1049.
69. Id. In addition to the Consumers Union court, another court which held that the com-
mercial nature of a use was not conclusive to a fair use examination was Dr. Pepper Co. v.
Sambo's, Restaurants, Inc. 517 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In Dr. Pepper, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered whether the defendant's use
of the plaintiff's copyrighted commercial in the defendant's commercial was a fair use. Id. at
1204. The plaintiff, Dr. Pepper, had developed a series of commercials centering around the
theme "Be A Pepper." Id. The defendant, Sambo's, later developed a commercial with the name
of "Dancing Seniors." Id. The defendant admitted to copying the plaintiff's commercials but
claimed that the "Dancing Seniors" commercial was a parody of the "Be A Pepper" commer-
cials and was therefore a fair use. Id. at 1208. In considering whether Sambo's "Dancing Seniors"
commercial was a fair use of Dr. Pepper's "Be A Pepper" commercial, the court first stated
that although Sambo's use was clearly commercial, the purpose of Sambo's use was not con-
clusive. Id. at 1208. The court concluded, however, that the commercial nature of the use would
cut against the fair use defense. Id. The court instead examined whether the defendant's use
harmed the economic value of the plaintiff's commercial. Id. The court concluded that the similarity
of the "Dancing Seniors" commercials would detract from the value of the "Be A Pepper"
commercial and therefore was not a fair use. Id. at 1208-09.
The parody defense that Sambo's claimed in Dr. Pepper is a well settled type of fair use.
Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1130-31 (1955).
A user may parody a copyrighted work and avoid an infringement action through the fair use
doctrine. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom., Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). Courts allow parody as a type of fair
use because courts reason that allowing parodies achieves the aim of copyright law to stimulate
artistic creativity. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). The alleged parody,
however, must fulfill at least two requirements. Id. at 182. First, the parody must comment critically
on the copyrighted material. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op. Prod.,
479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Next, the parody must not reduce the demand for the
copyrighted work. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964). See generally Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for
Copyright, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 615 (1979) (discussing parody as fair use).
70. 724 F.2d at 1049.
71. Id. In concluding that the commercial purpose of the defendant's use alone would not
defeat the fair use defense, the Consumers Union court distinguished between the purpose and
character of the defendant's use. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982) (first factor that court should




A majority of commercial advertising fair use cases since 1976 have fol-
lowed the drafters' explanation of the first factor of section 107 that section
107 is not limited to noncommercial uses.73 The courts, however, have not
applied as consistently the three other factors of section 107. 7 1 Of the three
other factors, courts have given the greatest weight to the fourth factor, the
court stated that although the purpose of the defendant's use was commercial, the character of
the use was the conveyance of useful information to the public. 724 F.2d at 1049. The court
concluded, therefore, that the defendant's use was conducive to a finding of fair use because
the advertisement conveyed factual information to the public. Id. at 1050.
72. 724 F.2d at 1050. In finding that defendant's television commercial did not merely ad-
vance the defendant's commercial interests, the Consumers Union court distinguished the instant
case from D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc. Id.; see D.C. Comics, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). In D.C. Comics, the defendant, Crazy Eddie, used the plaintiff D.C. Comics'
Superman character in an advertisement for Crazy Eddie's home video store. 205 U.S.P.Q. at
1178. D.C. Comics filed suit against Crazy Eddie, seeking to enjoin Crazy Eddie from any fur-
ther use of the Superman character in Crazy Eddie's advertisements. Id. Crazy Eddie claimed
that the use of Superman was a parody of the character and therefore a fair use. Id.; see Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.) (parody entitled to fair use finding) cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); supra note 69 (discussing parody as fair use). The D.C. Comics
court, however, held that Crazy Eddie's use was not a fair use because the defendant's use was
an unjustified appropriation for commercial gain. 205 U.S.P.Q. at 1178.
73. See supra note 65 (citing cases following § 107's rule that commercial purpose of use
not conclusive to fair use determination); H.R. Rap. No. 1476, 94ri CONG., 2D SEss. 66, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5679-80 (commercial purpose of use relevant but
not conclusive to examination of fair use question).
74. See 3 M. Nrnafil, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-62 to 65 (discussing courts' application
of three other factors of § 107, nature of copyrighted work, extent of use, and effect of use
on copyrighted work); 17 U.S.C. § 107(2),(3),(4) (1982) (three fair use factors other than purpose
and character of use). The second factor of section 107, the nature of the copyrighted work,
is not a major factor in most recent fair use cases. 3 M. NimeMR, supra note 23, § 13.05, at
13-62. Traditionally, courts were more receptive to fair use when the copyrighted work was of
a scientific nature, because the courts reasoned that authors of scientific works impliedly con-
sented to the use. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302,
304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (law readily permits fair use of scientific works because author impliedly
consents to use). The courts employing the implied consent theory of fair use relied on the English
case of Sayre v. Moore. 102 Eng. Rep. 361 (K.B. 1785). In Sayre, the defendant copied four
sea charts that the plaintiff had compiled into one large sea chart. Id. The court found, however,
that although the defendant had copied from the plaintiff's sea charts, the defendant had also
corrected several material errors in the plaintiff's charts. Id. In considering whether the defend-
ant had unjustifiably copied the plaintiff's work, the Sayre court stated that courts must balance
plaintiff's interest in financial reward and society's interest that courts not deprive the world
of scientific improvements. Id. The court concluded that the defendant's use was fair because
the defendant had improved on the plaintiff's copyrighted work. Id. Early fair use cases relied
on Sayre for the proposition that fair use is more readily available when the copyrighted work
is scientific because the author would consent to a use that promotes the growth of knowledge.
See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905) (author
of scientific material impliedly consents to later scientific use); Holt, 23 F. Supp. at 304 (author
consents to subsequent scientific use of copyrighted work).
At least one commercial advertising fair use case since 1976 has held that fair use is more
readily available when the copyrighted work is scientific because the author impliedly consents
to the use. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1981) (scientific material
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economic impact of the use on the market value of the copyrighted work."
In Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,7 6 the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered whether the defendant's use of past covers of the plaintiff's magazine,
TV Guide, in an advertisement was a fair use." The defendant, intending to
publish a television guide as a supplement to a local Sunday newspaper, printed
certain advertisements that compared the relative merits of the plaintiff's and
the defendant's television guides."' The Triangle court recognized that the
defendant's use might cause economic harm to the plaintiff's magazine but
has limited fair use protection). In Rubin, the defendant quoted from the plaintiff's philosophy
dissertation in defendant's magazine, Boston. Id. at 82. The defendant attempted to justify the
use by alleging that the plaintiff's writing was scientific. Id. at 84. The Rubin court rejected
the defendant's argument because the court found that the defendant's use was purely for com-
mercial reasons. Id. The Rubin court did not state expressly that the law allows fair use when
the copyrighted work is scientific because the author impliedly consents. Id. The court, however,
cited Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co. in which the First Circuit stated that courts
are more receptive to the fair use exemption when the copyrighted work is scientific because
the law reasons that the author impliedly consents to the use. See id.; Sampson & Murdock Co.
v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (Ist Cir. 1905) (scientific mat;erial has limited copyright
protection as first publisher of scientific material impliedly consents to subsequent use).
In Rubin, the First Circuit acknowledged the implied consent rationale with regard to the
nature of the copyrighted work. 645 F.2d at 84. The majority of courts are more receptive to
a fair use finding when the nature of the copyrighted work is informational. See Consumers
Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (fair use of informa-
tional copyrighted work more readily available); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (broader fair use scope when copyrighted work informa-
tional), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). The majority of courts reason, however, that the
risk of inhibiting the free flow of information is greater than the normal tensions between the
author's monopolistic rights and the public's interest in use when the copyrighted work is infor-
mational. See Consumers Union, 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (fair use scope greater when
copyrighted work informational to prevent greater risk to free flow of information); Rosemont
Enterprises, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (greater risk to dissemination of useful information
when copyrighted work informational justifies broader scope of fair use).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982) (fourth factor courts should include in fair use deter-
mination is economic effect of use on copyrighted work). The third fair use factor, the amount
of the use, was not of great significance in the majority of recent commercial advertising cases.
See, e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)
(discussing third factor in one paragraph); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen
Comm., 457 F. Supp 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (discussing third factor in one phrase). Further-
more, the cases that considered the extent of the use did not apply the third factor consistently.
3 M. NnIMR, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-65 (discussing third fair use factor). Some courts
considered only the physical quantity used, but a majority of the courts considering the third
fair use factor examined whether the use copied the essence of the copyrighted material. See
Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (Ist Cir. 1981) (defendant's use copied essential
part of copyrighted work); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (court found fair use in part because defendant's use did not
copy essence of copyrighted work); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F.
Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendant's use of a one minute, fifteen seconds excerpt from
one hour, twelve minute motion picture a significant taking because excerpt captured essence
of plaintiff's work), af'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1095, 1096 (2d Cir. 1982).
76. 626 F.2d at 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 1172.
78. Id. at 1172-73.
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concluded that such harm was not within the scope of section 107.1 9 The court
stated that section 107 intended to protect authors only from uses that cause
direct harm to the author's work by making use of the copyrighted material. 80
The court held that the defendant's use was a fair use because the court found
that the use did not harm the value of the plaintiff's copyrighted work by
exploiting the copyrighted work but only by demonstrating deficiencies in the
plaintiff's work.'
Although the Triangle court determined that the defendant's use was a
fair use primarily because the use had no immediate economic impact on the
copyrighted work, other commercial advertising cases have interpreted the
economic impact question differently. 8 In Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System,8 3 the defendant used clips in a news biography of Charlie
Chaplin from a compliation of excerpts from Charlie Chaplin films that the
plaintiff previously had copyrighted. 84 In considering whether the defendant's
use was fair, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York examined the economic effect of th& use on the market value not
only of the plaintiff's compilation but also of the original Charlie Chaplin
films that plaintiff also had copyrighted.8s The court stated that the question
regarding the economic impact of the use should be the effect of the use not
only on the copied work but also on derivative copyrighted works because
the use would affect each work equally.86 The court concluded that the use
would damage the market value of both the plaintiff's compilation and the
plaintiff's original films, and therefore the defendant's use was not a fair use.87
The present fair use case law is insufficient with regard to commercial
advertising because courts have failed to establish clear standards to deter-
mine whether a particular use is fair. 8  Furthermore, the continued growth
79. Id. at 1177. In considering whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's magazine covers
in a comparative advertisement was fair, the Triangle court dealt cursorily with the first three
fair use factors. See id. at 1175-77. The court noted that the defendant's use was commercial
but concluded that the purpose of the defendant's use was only relevant and not conclusive to
the fair use examination. Id. at 1175. The court further noted that the plaintiff's copyrighted
work was also commercial but held that the nature of the copyrighted work is irrelevant to a
fair use determination. Id. at 1176. In considering the amount of the copyrighted work that defend-
ant's use had copied, the Triangle court stated that the amount copied was insignificant because
the defendant's use did not copy the essence of the copyrighted work. Id. at 1177.
80. Id. at 1178 (quoting Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations
on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIm. L. Rnv. 283, 305-06 (1979)).
81. 626 F.2d at 1178.
82. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing broader interpretation of
economic impact question).
83. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1095, 1096 (2d
Cir. 1980).
84. Id. at 1142.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1145.
87. Id.; see infra note 112 (proposed method to analyze effect of use on copyrighted work).
88. See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text (discussing unsettled fair use case law
under 1976 Act). The present fair use doctrine is ineffective with regard to commercial advertis-
ing because the present doctrine does not protect the rights of authors sufficiently. See Gordon,
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of commercial advertising in recent years necessitates a clarification of the
present doctrine to provide authors and potential users with more reliable
guidelines of behavior.8 9 The present Copyright Act, unfortunately, does little
to resolve the confusion among the courts.9" The four factors of section 107
are not a code of fair use, but merely a list of factors that past fair use cases
have considered in examining whether a particular use was fair use. 9' Further-
more, section 107 does not require a court to consider all four factors in a
fair use determination 92 nor does section 107 indicate which of the four fac-
tors courts should weigh most heavily. 9"
The major difficulty with present commercial advertising case law is the
courts' perception of the copyright scheme. 94 The purpose of the copyright
clause is to promote the growth of knowledge for the benefit of the public."
The Framers of the Constitution intended to achieve that goal by providing
the author with the incentive to create by allowing the author to obtain a
copyright and thereby receive payment for the use of his copyrighted work. 9
Courts developed the fair use doctrine to ensure that the author did not frustrate
the purpose of the copyright clause by unreasonably preventing others from
using his work. 9 Under the interpretation of the copyright clause that the
author is the instrument that will provide new knowledge, then, courts should
find fair use only when the author's interest in protecting the value of his
copyrighted work is unreasonable, given society's interest in access to and use
supra note 17, at 1619. Furthermore, the prejudice that the present fair use doctrine causes to
authors' rights affects the public because the authors will have less incentive to produce works
of public interest. Id. at 1618.
89. See R. PosNER, REGULATION OF ADvERTiSING BY Tm FTC 3-10 (1973) (discussing need
for regulation of advertising); L. SELTZER, supra note 4, at 21-23 (discussing ineffectiveness of
Copyright Act in providing clear standards of enforcement).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89 (discussing deficiencies in Copyright Act's
codification of fair use); infra text accompanying notes 91-98 (same).
91. 3 M. NIMIER, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-57. The four factors of section 107 are
not necessarily the only factors that a court may consider in the fair use context. Id.; see Cohen,
supra note 47, at 53 (discussing other factors that courts have considered in fair use context).
The two other factors that courts have included involve the user. Cohen, supra note 47, at 53.
The first is the intent of the user, which involves the relative good faith of the defendant in
using the copyrighted work without the author's consent. See Iowa State University v. American
Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use holding bolstered by finding that defendant
acted in bad faith). Another factor that courts have considered is the amount of effort the user
added to the use, aside from the copied portions. See Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing users to add own contributions to copyrighted
work is in interests of creativity).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5679-80 (bill not intended to freeze fair use doctrine but to allow
courts to apply it on case-by-case basis).
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 100 & 101 (discussing cases that considered author impediment to and
not instrument of free flow of information).
95. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1964).
96. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 15-22 (discussing copyright clause).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28 (discussing origins of fair use doctrine).
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of new knowledge.98 In determining whether an author is unreasonable, courts
should not act to reduce the author's legitimate incentive to produce because
the author remains the copyright clause's instrument to produce useful
knowledge. 9 The commercial advertising fair use case law, however, views
the author not as the instrument of society's access to new knowledge but
as an impediment to societal access.'10 Under this rationale, courts misconceive
the equities of the fair use doctrine to find fair use when the use promotes
some societal interest, assuming that the author unreasonably prevented ac-
cess to his copyrighted work only because the use promoted a public interest.'0 '
The present rationale, therefore, actually undermines the purpose of the
copyright clause because the present rationale reduces the incentive to create
by unfairly ignoring the author's legitimate interest in remuneration. 2
Any test of fair use should consider the fair use question in economic
terms because the basis of the copyright scheme is economic.'0 An author
98. See infra text accompanying notes 108-38 (fair use test under correct conception of
fair use doctrine).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (Congress empowered to grant copyright protection
to encourage author to produce new works).
100. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177
n. 16 (5th Cir. 1980). In Triangle, the plaintiff, publisher of TV Guide magazine, sought to enjoin
the defendant from using the covers of plaintiff's magazine in a comparative advertisement. Id.
at 1172-73. In analyzing the defendant's fair use defense, the Triangle court found that the defend-
ant's use did not cause a significant amount of harm to the value of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work. Id. at 1177. The court stated, however, that the defendant's use did not harm plaintiff's
copyrighted work because the plaintiff did not prove the harm. Id. at 1177 n.16. In other words,
the court placed the burden on the copyright owner to prove economic harm to protect the copyright.
See id.
101. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Consumers Union, the plaintiff, Consumers Union, brought suit to enjoin the defendant, General
Signal Corporation, from further use of Consumers Union's copyrighted material in defendant's
television advertisements. Id. at 1046. In considering the defendant's fair use defense, the court
noted that since Consumers Union's work was informational, the scope of fair use was greater
because the risk of restraining the free flow of information was greater. Id. at 1050. The Con-
sumers Union court's statement demonstrates the court's assumption that an author will be an
impediment to societal access to copyrighted works. See id.; see also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair use doctrine broader when copyrighted
work informational as greater assurance that information not restricted), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967).
102. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966) (fair use based on point at which courts subordinate author's interest to society's), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). By granting fair use when society's interest in access outweighs
the author's interest in remuneration, courts are unfairly ignoring the author's legitimate interest
in remuneration. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1615. An author's reasonable interest in remunera-
tion reflects the legitimate value of the copyrighted work. Id. Value, however, is the aggregate
consumer willingness to pay. R. PosNER, AN EcoNoMc ANALYsis OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977). Con-
sequently, when a court grants fair use because society's interest outweighs the author's, the court
is denying the author the opportunity to sell the use at precisely the price society is willing to
pay. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1615.
103. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
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is interested primarily in remuneration and a copyright fulfills that interest.0 4
The fair use doctrine ensures that the author's interest in remuneration does
not defeat society's interest in access to useful information.' 5 Defined
economically, the fair use doctrine ensures that an author does not frustrate
the purpose of the copyright clause by demanding a price for use that is
unreasonably higher than what society is willing to pay.' 6
The suggested fair use test, therefore, is a two step analysis.0 7 A court
should first determine the price an author expects from others for use of the
author's copyrighted work." 0 A court should then determine the value that
society places on the use.0 9 If the author's price for a use is unreasonably
higher than society's willingness to pay, then the court should find fair use
because the author's interest in remuneration is defeating society's interest
in access to useful information." '
In determining the price an author expects for use of his work, courts
should examine the economic effect of the use on the copyrighted work."'
The value of a copyrighted work decreases as use increases so an examination
104. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing "public goods" characteristic
of writings).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28 (discussing origins of fair use).
106. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Fair use balances the author's interest in remuneration
with society's interest in access. Id. The author's copyright, however, grants the author monopolistic
control over access. L. SELTZER, supra note 4, at 8; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (copyright allows
authors to control use). The danger of any monopolistic control is that the holder of the power
may inflate the price for use. See R. POSNER, supra note 102, at 198-200 (discussing effect of
monopolies on pricing). As a result of the artificially inflated price, however, the quantity demanded
will decrease. Id. at 4-5. In terms of the copyright clause, the author's inflated price will mean
that societal use will decrease. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 1614-15 (discussing effect of market
failure on copyright system). The inflated price, therefore, defeats the purpose of the copyright
clause to promote societal access to useful knowledge. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The correct value of any copyrighted work is the aggregate consumer willingness to pay for use
of that work. Polinsky, Economic Analysis As a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide
to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HAmv. L. REv. 1655, 1679-81 (1974). When an author
expects more for access than society is willing to pay, the author is defeating the constitutional
purpose of the copyright clause and a court should find fair use. See supra note 23 (rationale
of fair use doctrinej).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-110 (proposed fair use test).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111-128 (discussing courts' examination of price author
expects for use).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 130-144 (discussing court's examination of societal
value of use).
110. See supra note 106 (discussing basis for economic test).
111. 3 M. NmoaxmR, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-65 (examination of effect of use on copyrighted
work is examination of effect on market value of copyrighted work). The examination of the
economic effect of the use on the copyrighted work reflects the author's price for use because
the purpose of the copyright clause is to protect the author's interest in remuneration and the
law assumes that the author will maximize his remuneration. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) (author will seek potential users to maximize profits); supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text (one purpose of copyright is to ensure author's ability to obtain remuneration). The
author, therefore, will charge a price that will reflect the corresponding decrease in market value
of the work. See R. POSNER, supra note 107, at 4 (seller's price reflects opportunity cost).
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of the economic effect of the use reflects the compensation an author should
expect for the decreased value of the copyrighted work. II2 A court's examina-
tion of the economic effect of the use, however, should operate within certain
guidelines to determine whether the price the author expects for use is
reasonable."I Courts should distinguish between uses that expose deficiencies
in or improve on the copyrighted work" 4 and uses that merely serve as a
substitute for the original work."' The price an author expects for a use that
112. See supra note 111 (discussing economic effect reflecting price). In examining the economic
effect of a use on the market value of the copyrighted work, courts should consider not only
the effect of the particular use but also the effect of a fair use finding on the market value of
the copyrighted work. 3 M. NlbaliR, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-65. The majority of commer-
cial advertising fair use cases consider only the effect of the particular use. See supra notes 76-81
and accompanying text (discussing cases applying limited interpretation of economic effect fac-
tor). A court examining the effect of only the particular use, however, does not gauge accurately
the economic impact of the fair use finding. 3 M. NInMER, supra note 23, § 13.05, at 13-66.
A finding of fair use under a certain set of facts implies that a similar use in the future might
also be fair use. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(finding defendant's use to be fair use destroys value of plaintiff's copyright and means others
also may use).
The future effects of a fair use finding, therefore, might impair seriously the incentive factor
necessary to achieve the purpose of the copyright clause. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes
15-18 (incentive from copyright protection promotes growth of knowledge). For example, in Con-
sumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's use
of excerpts from plaintiff's consumer magazine in the defendant's advertising. 724 F.2d 1044,
1046-48 (2d Cir. 1983). The plaintiff, Consumers Union, argued that the defendant's use would
decrease the market value of future issues of Consumer Reports. Id. at 1051. The Second Circuit,
however, rejected Consumers Union's argument, stating that the economic effect factor focuses
only on the effect of the use on the copyrighted work from which defendant copied. Id. Arguably,
the Second Circuit misapplied the economic effect factor because the court failed to consider
how the fair use finding would affect CU's incentive to publish its magazine. See id. In Con-
sumers Union the defendant received favorable ratings from Consumer Reports and used the
ratings in a television commercial. Id. at 1045-46. The Second Circuit's fair use finding, however,
could undermine the economic efficacy of Consumer Reports since the court's finding implies
that future similar uses are also fair uses. Cf. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (finding in instant case of fair use implies future similar uses also fair
and thus destroys value of copyright). The increased exploitation of future issues of Consumer
Reports, however, would decrease the consumer's desire to purchase future issues of Consumer
Reports. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 1611 (public goods characteristics of intellectual property
cause underproduction without copyright protection because use not controllable); Demsetz, supra
note 7, at 295 (defining public goods). As a result, public access to Consumer Reports, a con-
sumer information magazine, will decrease, and consequently will defeat the purpose of the copyright
clause. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (purpose of copyright clause to promote growth of
useful information).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 114-130 (guidelines of proposed analysis of work's
value to author).
114. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177
(5th Cir. 1980) (defendant's use of covers from plaintiffs copyrighted magazine in comparative
advertisement demonstrating relative superiority of defendant's product does not harm copyrighted
work within contemplation of economic effect factor); Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 361, 362
(K.B. 1785) (defendant's use not unfair because defendant corrected mistakes in plaintiff's copyright
work).
115. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Pro-
ducts, Inc. 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (defendant's use of copyrighted speeches in
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exposes deficiencies in the copyrighted work will always be unreasonable, or
at least greater than the price an author should expect for the use. 116 Courts
should measure the price an author should expect for a use by the extent a
use affects adversly the market value of the author's work by exploiting the
market value of the copyrighted work." 7 A use that exposes deficiencies in
the author's work will affect adversely the market value of the work without
exploiting the market value of the copyrighted work."' The use will reduce
the original work's value by demonstrating the relative superiority of the user's
work." 9 The author's price for such a use, therefore, will always be greater
than what the author should expect for the use. 20 Similarly, the price an author
expects for uses that improve on the original work will always be unreasonable
because such uses also reduce the work's market value but by presenting a
superior product to the public.2 ' Furthermore, courts should not reject uses
that expose deficiencies in or improve on the copyrighted work because reject-
ing such uses would defeat in two ways the purpose of the copyright clause
to promote the growth of useful knowledge.'2 2 First, uses that demonstrate
the relative superiority of the user's work promote the growth of useful
knowledge.' 23 Second, uses that demonstrate the superiority of the user's work
encourage the author to improve on the original and thereby further promote
the growth of useful knowledge.'24
In contrast to uses that expose deficiencies in or improve on the copyrighted
work, courts should accept as reasonable the price an author expects for uses
commercial advertising intended only to promote defendant's own financial interests); D.C. Comics,
Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's use of Super-
man character in advertisement not fair use because use unjustified appropriation for personal gain).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 117-120 (author's price for use that criticizes copyrighted
works always unreasonable).
117. See supra text accompanying note 111 (effect of use reflects price author should expect
for use).
118. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177
(5th Cir. 1980) (use that truthfully criticizes copyrighted work is not mere copy).
119. See id. (defendant's use intended to show superiority of defendant's television magazine).
120. See supra text accompanying note 117 (price author expects is extent of adverse economic
effect of use). In considering what price to charge, an author will consider the economic effects
of a use. Id. The author's price for use, however, may be larger than what the law allows because
the author may consider economic effects that the law does not consider in determining the price
an author should expect for use. Id.; see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (truthfully critical use affects work in way law does
not consider adverse).
121. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)
(denying fair use when use improves on copyrighted work defeats growth of creativity); Cf. supra,
text accompanying notes 35-43 (mere copying rationale provides that mere copies add nothing
to useful knowledge).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 123-24 (rejecting uses that improve on or expose
deficiencies in copyrighted works defeats purpose of copyright clause).
123. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (1983) (comparative advertising fosters products improvement
and educates society).
124. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176
n.13 (comparative advertising promotes competition); R. PosNER, supra note 102, at 501 (com-
petition promotes growth and benefits public).
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that merely copy from the author's work. 25 The price an author expects for
such uses is the price the author should expect because uses that merely copy
from the original reduce the market value of the copyrighted work by ex-
ploiting the value of the author's work. 26 Furthermore, finding that the price
an author expects for such uses is unreasonable undermines the purpose of
the copyright.' 27 Allowing users to copy from the author's work reduces the
author's incentive to create because such uses substitute for the author's work
in the market and thereby deny the author remuneration for his creative
efforts. 
1 2 8
After a court determines the price an author should expect for a use, the
court should determine the societal benefits of the use because the societal
benefits reflect the amount society would pay for a particular use.'29 In deter-
mining the value of the use, a court should examine the informational character
of the use because as a general rule, the societal value of a use increases as
the informational value of the use increases.' 30 In the commercial advertising
context, the societal value of a use often may be quite different from the price
an advertiser would pay for use of a copyrighted work.' 3' Many uses have
no informational value and thus no societal value but nonetheless are valuable
to an advertiser because of the notoriety of the copyrighted work that the
defendant uses in the advertisement.' 32 Conversely, a use may be of great value
125. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128 (author's price for uses that merely copy
are always reasonable). Even though a court should assume that an author's price for a use that
merely copies the author's work is reasonable, a court should allow the defendant to prove that the
author's price is, for some other reason, inflated. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 1633. The author
may have what one commentator calls the antidissemination motive. Id.; see Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (copyright owner purchased
copyrights to deny any access to copyrighted work), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). This
antidissemination motive is unreasonable because the author's motive is not to obtain payment
but only to deny the public access to information and therefore is directly contrary to the purpose
of the copyright clause. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1633. The antidissemination motive is prevalent
in parody, criticism, and potentially hostile works. Id. at 1632-35. The motive may occur, however,
in connection with mere copying. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q.
1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff objected to defendant's use because of damage to reputa-
tion of copyrighted work). The court, therefore, should attempt to determine the legally recognizable
adverse economic effects of the use. Gordon, supra note 17, at 1633.
126. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(defendant's use unjustified appropriation of notoriety of plaintiff's work); supra note 111 (price
reflects economic effect of use on market value of copyrighted work).
127. See supra note 102 (denying author's legitimate interest in remuneration undermines
purpose of copyright clause).
128. Id.
129. Polinsky, supra note 106, at 1679-81 (value is aggregate consumer willingness to pay).
130. See R. POSNER, supra note 102, at 29 (monetary value of resource reflects benefit to
society); see also Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1983) (informational works are of significant public interest); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (defendant's use solely for personal
profit advances no public interest).
131. See, e.g., D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1177 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (defendants used cartoon character in advertisement for video equipment store).
132. See, e.g., Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fasion Modelling, Inc.,
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to society but of little value to an advertiser because the copyrighted work
is relatively unknown. 133 In determining whether a use in commercial adver-
tising is fair, however, courts should examine only the societal value of the
use and not the value to the advertiser since only a determination of the societal
value of a use determines whether a fair use finding promotes the growth of
useful knowledge." ' Consequently, the value of a use to the advertiser is not
relevant in the fair use context. 35 Once a court determines whether a use has
societal value, the court should decide whether the author expects more for
use than he should, given the societal value of the use.' 36 If the price the author
expects is unreasonably greater than the societal value of the use, then the
court should find fair use.' 37 Application of the proposed two step analysis
to commercial advertising would provide results more simply and consistently
than in past commercial advertising fair use cases. 
138
Commercial advertising consists of two main groups, comparative and
noncomparative. 39 Comparative advertising uses a competitor's copyrighted
work to demonstrate the superiority of the user's product."' Noncomparative
advertising exists in two varieties, the first of which is use without acknowledge-
ment of the copyrighted work solely to exploit the notoriety of the copyrighted
work to the user's advantage.'' The other variety, noncomparative advertis-
ing with acknowledgement, uses the copyrighted work to promote the user's
product but only because the copyrighted work promotes the user's product
in some specific way.' 2
105 F. Supp., 325, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (defendants used covers from Vogue magazine in
advertisement for modeling school).
133. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 303
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (defendants used excerpts from plaintiff's book discussing human voice mechanism
in cigarette advertisement).
134. R. POSNaR, supra note 102, at 29 (monetary value of resource reflects benefit to society).
135. See id.
136. See supra note 106 (discussing basis of economic analysis test).
137. Id.
138. Compare infra text accompanying notes 143-154 (discussing per se rule of fair use with
regard to particular advertising) with supra text accompanying notes 87-89 (inconsistency of present
fair use doctrine).
139. See infra text accompanying notes 140-142 (defining types of commercial advertising).
140. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1172
(5th Cir. 1980). In Triangle, the defendant's use was a comparative advertisement. Id. at 1172.
The defendant in Triangle was the publisher of a local newspaper. Id. In several television com-
mercials, the defendant discussed the relative merits of the television supplement accompanying
the defendant's newspaper and the plaintiff's magazine, TV Guide. Id. at 1172-73.
141. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
In D.C. Comics, the defendant, a retailer of home video equipment, used the plaintiff's copyrighted
comic book character in several advertisements for the defendant's store. Id. The D.C. Comics
court held that the defendant's use was an unjustified appropriation of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work for personal gain. Id.
142. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Consumers Union, the defendant used excerpts from the plaintiff's magazine in a television




The application of the proposed fair use test to commercial advertising
would result in two per se rules of fair use.' 43 First, under the proposed fair
use test, the price a copyright owner would expect for use in a comparative
advertisement will always be unreasonably higher than the value society places
on the use, and therefore courts should always find that comparative advertis-
ing is fair use.' 4 The price a copyright owner should expect for a use in com-
parative advertising is negligible because comparative advertising does not
challenge the copyrighted product's market by taking advantange of the creative
efforts of the copyright owner. 4 5 Instead, comparative advertising challenges
the copyrighted product's market by demonstrating to the public the relative
advantages of the user's product, and therefore the price an author will ex-
pect for the use will be unreasonable.' 46 The finding of fair use will encourage
the copyright owner to improve on the original and thereby further benefit
the public even though allowing comparative advertising uses as fair uses tem-
porarily may reduce the value of the copyrighted work.' 4 7 Furthermore, a use
in comparative advertising is of substantial societal value because compar-
tative advertising helps consumers make more informed choices by presenting
the relative virtues of competing products.'4 8 Under the proposed fair use test,
therefore, the use of copyrighted material in comparative advertising is always
fair use."'
In contrast to comparative advertising, courts should never find that non-
comparative advertising without acknowledgement is fair use.' 50 The price an
author should expect for a use in noncomparative advertising would be substan-
tial since the use merely exploits the copyrighted work's notoriety.' 5' In other
words, the use acts as a substitute in the marketplace for the copyrighted
work.' Finally, the use has no societal value because the use provides no
new information to the public.'5 3 Noncomparative advertising without
143. See infra text accompanying notes 143-154 (per se rules of fair use).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 108-110 (defining proposed fair use test).
145. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177
(5th Cir. 1980) (comparative advertising harms copyrighted work in way not related to use of
copyright but on market). Comparative advertising does not unfairly affect the market value
of a copyrighted work since comparative advertising does not substitute itself for the copyrighted
work. See id. A comparative advertisement is successful despite the copyrighted work because
a comparative advertisement is an explanation of the relative advantages of the defendant's and
plaintiff's products. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1176 n.13 (comparative advertising promotes competition); 16 C.F.R. § 14.15
(1983) (comparative advertising fosters product improvements).
148. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (1983) (truthful comparative advertising benefits society by educating
consumers of relative virtues of competing products).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 147-148 (inflated price for access and substantial
public interest); supra text accompanying notes 108-110 (defining proposed fair use test).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161 (per se rule against noncomparative adver-
tising as fair use).
151. See supra note 141 (defining noncomparative advertising without acknowledgement).
152. Id.; see supra note 111 (explaining author's reasonable price for use).
153. See supra note 141 (defining noncomparative advertising without acknowledgement);
supra note 112 (explaining societal value of use).
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acknowledgement, therefore, is never fair use because the author's legitimate
expectation in remuneration is always substantially greater than the societal
value of the use.'1
4
Noncomparative advertising with acknowledgement, adoptive advertising,
is the most complex type of advertising with regard to the proposed fair use
test.15 Adoptive advertising with acknowledgement uses the copyrighted work
to promote the user's product but only because the copyrighted work pro-
motes the user's product in some way. 5 6 Adoptive advertising with
acknowledgement can have a significant effect on the economic value of the
copyrighted work since the advertising can act as a substitute for the copyrighted
work.' 57 This type of advertising, however, also provides the public with an
unbiased opinion of the benefits of the user's product and thus helps con-
sumers make a more informed choice in the market place." 8 Thus, both the
author's legitimate expectation of remuneration and the societal value of the
use are substantial.' 59 Under the proposed fair use test, however, the presump-
tion is in favor of the copyright owner as the copyright owner is the copyright
clause's instrument in promoting the growth of useful knowledge. 60 Conse-
quently, adoptive advertising with acknowledgement should never be fair use. 6,
Under the proposed fair use test, therefore, only comparative advertising
should be fair use since allowing fair use for comparative advertising pro-
motes societal access to useful information.'62 In contrast, noncomparative
advertising should not be fair use because noncomparative advertising under-
mines the incentive of authors to create and thereby defeats the purpose of
154. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (defining proposed fair use test).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59 (relative interests in noncomparative adver-
tising with acknowledgement substantially similar).
156. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1046-49 (2d Cir.
1983). In Consumers Union, the defendant used excerpts from the plaintiff's magazine, Con-
sumer Reports, and acknowledged the source because Consumer Reports praised the defendant's
product. Id.
157. See id. at 1047. In Consumers Union, the defendant used excerpts from the results
of independent product testing in the plaintiff's magazine. Id. The sole purpose of the plaintiff's
magazine, however, was to convey such information to the public. Id. The defendant's use,
therefore, served as a substitute for the plaintiff's copyrighted work. See id.
158. See id. at 471 (defendant's use conveys valuable information to public).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 157-158 (economic effect and informational benefit
of noncomparative advertising with acknowledgement); supra notes 111-124 (economic effect and
informational benefit determine author's legitimate interest in remuneration and societal value
of use).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (proposed fair use test views author as instru-
ment to achieve purpose of copyright clause).
161. Id. Noncomparative advertising should not be fair use because the author's incentives
to produce new works would decrease if a court allowed a use that substituted for the copyrighted
work in the market. See supra note 111 (author's interest in remuneration reflects anticipation
of decreased value); supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (decreased valuation reduces author's
incentive to produce new works).




copyrights.' 63 The proposed fair use test, therefore, simplifies and stabilizes' 6'
the law of fair use by proposing a less complex, more economically based
test of fair use. 65 Furthermore, the proposed fair use test is more equitable
than the present fair use case law in that the test considers authors instruments
of, and not impediments to, the copyright clause.'66 As a result, the proposed
fair use test would ensure the constitutional purpose of the copyright clause
to promote the growth of useful knowledge while also accomodating the in-




163. See supra notes 150-161 and accompanying text (discussing noncomparative advertising
under proposed test).
164. Compare supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (instability of present fair use doctrine)
with supra text accompanying 149-150 (per se fair use rules under proposed test).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 103-138 (economic basis of proposed fair use test).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 103-110 (authors' equities protected under proposed
fair use test).
167. See supra note 106 (proposed fair use test ensures constitutional purpose of copyright).
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